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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
HARRY WALTERS and BETTY
WALTERS, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.
ROBERT W. BRANDT, Administrator of the Estate of Barbara
Best Pelly, appointed in Utah,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No.
9880

BRIEF OF APPE:LLANT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND O·F CASE
Appellant appeals to the Supreme Court of Utah
from a jury verdict entered in the District Court
of Sevier County and the denial of Defendant's
Motion for a New Trial. Plaintiffs were awarded
damages for personal injuries and property damages resulting from an automobile accident that
involved a pickup truck driven by plaintiff Harry
Walters, and an automobile driven by Barbara Best
Pelly, who was killed in the accident.
DISPOSIT]jON IN THE

LOWE~R

COURT

The jury returned a verdict in favor of the
1
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plaintiffs. Defendant filed a timely motion for new
trial which was denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPE.AL
The appellant seeks to have the Judgment on
the Verdict vacated and the case remanded for a
new trial.
STATEMENT O·F FACTS
August 22, 1953, at about 5:15 p.m., Harry
Walters, accompanied by Betty Walters, his wife,
was driving south on Highway 89, approximately
V2 .mile south of Aurora, Utah. Mrs. Barbara Best
Pelly, accompanied by her daughter, was driving
north on Highway 89. The pickup truck driven by
Harry Walters collided broadside with the Chevrolet automobile driven by Barbara Best Pelly. Mr.
and Mrs. Walters were injured and Mrs. Pelly and
her daughter were killed.
There ·is a conflict of evidence as to the path
of the Walters' car just prior to the accident. The
evidence is undisputed that the Pelly vehicle pulled
slightly off to the right side of the road, approximately 55 feet south of the point of impact betwe·en
the vehicles (R. 194), then turned left across a
bridge to the west side of the road, and at a point
approximately 4 feet west of the center of the highway (R. 260), while angled toward the northwest,
the Pelly vehicle was struck in the middle of the
right side by the front of the Walters' pickup truck.
(R. 292-293)
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Mr. W·alters and his wife testified that they
had passed another southbound vehicle, some distance north of the scene of the accident, and had
travelled on the west side of the road for most of
the distance from Aurora. (R. 182-R. 102)
Alden Roberts, an eyewitness to the accident,
testified that the Walters vehicle was attempting
to pass two southbound automobiles, and had travelled on the left, or the east side of the road for
approximately 3 to 4 blocks. (R. 295-297) Roberts
saw the Pelly car approaching from the south on
its own side of the highway, and .at the time Mrs.
Pelly approached the bridge, near the accident ~cene,
the Walters car was on the wrong side of the road.
(R. 291, R. 302) The Pelly automobile turned sharply
to the West, across the bridge; and simultaneously
the Walters vehicle was suddenly turned to the west
side of the road. (R. 293) The Walters vehicle colljded with the right side of the Pelly automobile.
(R. 208)
There was evidence at the trial by the witness
Robert Averett, that he had followed the Pelly automobile for about a mile, keeping right behind it,
and that he, Averett, was not travelling in excess
of 50 miles per hour. (R. 196) The speed limit was
posted as 60 miles per hour. Averett testified that
at the moment of the impact, the Walters pickup
truck was facing southwest and was turning from
the east to the west side of the road, and was par3
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tially on its wrong side, or the east side of the road,
at impact. (R. 204, Exhibit 3) Tire marks on fhe
east side of the road leading directly to the left
wheels of the pickup truck were 40 feet in length.
(R. 203, R. 204)
Just before reaching the bridge near the accident scene, the right wheels of the Pelly car were
off the hard surface portion of the road. The investigating police officer identified tire mark~ from the
east shoulder, south of the bridge, where the marks
then turned to the west, across the bridge to the
point of impact, the entire marks being 57 feet" in
length to the west edge of the highway, which was
approximately 5 feet west of the impact. (R.. 228,
R. 232)

Photographs of the Pelly automobile and the
Walters truck show the impact on the vehicles,
clearly indicating that the Walters pickup truck hit
the P.elly automobile broadside, in the middle of
the right side, with no damage to the rear fender
or front fender of the. Pelly automobile; ·(Exhibits
5 ·and 6)
The action was tried to a jury and a verdict
wasreturned in favor of the plaintiffs.

4
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STATEMENT OF P!OINTS
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING INSTRUCTION 17 TO THE JURY, SAID INSTRUCTION BEING
A VERDICT DIRECTING (FORMULA) INSTRUCTION
WHICH DID NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE DEFENHANT'S THEORY OF THE CASE.
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT
THE JURY IN ACCORDANCE WITH DEFENDANT'S
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 13, RELATING TO
THE STATUTORY DUTY OF A DRIVER OPERATING
A VEHICLE TO THE LEFT OF THE CENTER OF THE
HIGHWAY IN OVERTAKING AND PASSING ANOTHER
VEHICLE TRAVELLING IN THE SAME DIRECTION.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING TO
THE JURY THE QUESTION OF DEFENDANT'S SPEED,
AS NEGLIGENCE.
POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SUBMIT
TO THE JURY DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED.INSTRUCTION NO. 7, WHICH INSTRUCTION ENCOMPASSED
THE DEFENDANT'S THEORY OF THE CASE THAT
THE CONDUCT OF THE PLAINTIFF CREATED AN
EMERGENCY SITUATION, AND WHICH THEORY WAS
SUPPORTED BY COMPET'ENT, SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT .ERRED IN REFUSING TO
GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO.
3, WHICH INSTRUCTION SET FORTH THE STATUTORY RULE AS TO THE NATURE OF EVIDENCE
REQUIRED WHEN THE TORT FEASOR IS DEAD.
5
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POINT VI.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING REPETITIOUS INSTRUCTIONS WHICH PREJUDICIALLY EMPHASIZED PLAINTIFF'S THEORY OF RECOVERY IN
THE CASE.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING INSTRUCTION 17 TO THE JURY, SAID INSTRUCTION BEING
A VERDICT DIRECTING (FORMULA) INSTRUCTION
WHICH DID NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE DEFENDANT'S THEORY OF THE CASE.

Defendant's theory and defense in this case was
that the truck driven by Harry Walters was travelling on its left, or wrong side of the road, just prior
to the collision and an emergency situation was
created as the Walters vehicle and the Pelly automobile approached, and that both vehicles, with a
headon collision imminent, turned to the west side
of the road almost simultaneously.
The evidence from the eyewitness Alden Rob_erts, who was following the Walters pickup truck,
was clear and unequivocal that the pickup truck
was driven on the east half of the road, southbound,
for three or four blocks, until just a second before
the accident, (R297) and the Pelly automobile was
on its right side of the road as it approached the
bridge, and. at the time the Pelly vehicle was near
the bridge, Walters was still on the left side of the
road (R. 291). Mr. Roberts testified that both vehicles suddenly turned to the west side of the road.
6
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(R. 292) The physical evidence shows clearly that
Mrs. Pelly was on the east side of the road, her
right side, until she was within less than 60 feet
from the point of impact. (R. 228, R. 232) The eyewitness Averett testified that the Pelly car was on
its right side, east side, of the road until it got to
the bridge, then it turned up sharply to the west
side of the road. (R. 194) Averett further testified
as to the position of the Walters car at impact,
being angled across the center of the road, partially
on the wrong side (R. 204 and Exhibit 3}, and he
observed tire marks on the east side of the road
leading directly to the pickup truck as it was stopped after the accident. (R. 199-R. 203)
Instruction No. 17 given by the court was as
follows:
"In order for you to find a verdict in
favor of the Plaintiffs and against the Defendant, the Plaintiffs have the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence
one or more of the following facts:
A. That the Defendant was driving her
automobile at a speed in excess of 60 miles
per hour.
B. In crossing the center line of the
highway into the opposing lane of traffic
when it was not safe so to do.
.
C. In failing to keep said automobile
under proper control.
D. In failing to keep a proper lookout
and in failing to see the automobile driven
by the Plaintiff.
7
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E. In running head on into the automobile of the Plain tiff.
"The plaintiffs have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that
one or more of the acts or o1nissions designated as A, B, C, D, & E was the efficient and
moving cause which in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new, independent cause, produced the collision which
resulted in the injuries and damage alleged
and claimed by the Plaintiff.
"The Plaintiffs ha:v·e the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence what
damage, if any, they suffered; if you find the
Defendant negligent in any one or more of
the items set out in A, B, C, D, and E, and
if you find that one or more of such acts or
omissions were the proximate cause of the
injuries to Plaintiffs, then you must find for
the Plaintiffs in such amounts as your judgment dictates and directs. Such an award for
Plaintiff Harry Walters, must not exceed the
sum of 5,000.00 general damages and $100.00
special damages, while damages awarded the
Plaintiff. Betty Walters, must not exceed
$50,000.00 general damages and $160.50 special damages. In specifying this limit of damages, you are not to construe it as an intimation of what your verdict as to damages
should be. In determining the amount of such
damages, you may consider, so far as is shown
by ·evidence, the nature, character and extent
of injuries suffered. by Mr. Walters and Mrs.
Walters, whether such injuries are temporary
or permanent; and you may also take into
consideration the pain and suffering, past
8
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and future, so far as shown by the evidence,
and to award such damages as will reasonably
and justly compensate for the injuries sustained, not exceeding the sum of $5,100.00 in
the case of Harry Walters, the amount he
has prayed for in his complaint, and the sum
of $50,160.50 in the case of Betty Walters, th~
amount she has claimed in her Complaint."
In· this instruction the court set forth each and
every allegation ·of negligence claimed by the plaintiffs, had a paragraph on preponderance of the evidnece and in the third paragraph of the instruction
charged the jury:
"The Plaintiffs have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence what
damage, if any, they suff.ered; if you find the
Defendant negligent in any one or more of
the items set out in A, B, C, D, and E, and
if you find that one or more of such acts or
omissions were the proximate cause of the
injuries to Plaintiffs, then you must find for
the Plaintiffs in such amount as your judgment dictates and directs. (Emphasis ours)
This is the so-called formula instruction and
by telling the jury they must return a verdict for
plaintiff if they found the defendant committed certain acts or omissions the court has ignored completely the defendant's theory and defense.
Instruction 17 is further erroneous in that the
court in the first paragraph of the instruction, instructed the jury, that in order to find for the
plaintiffs and against the defendants, the plaintiffs
9
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had the burden of proving one or more of the facts
set forth as a, b, c, d, or e.
There was no dispute in the case that the Pelly
automobile was to the left side of the center of the
highway at the time of collision. The defendant's
theory of the case was that the Pelly vehicle turned
to the left side of the road almost simultaneously
with the turning to the west side of the road, back
to his proper side, by Mr. Walters. Defendant's
defense was based upon the factual situation that
the two cars approaching headon, on the East side
of the road, resulted in an emergency situation
whereby Mrs. Pelly had to make an instantaneous
decision, continue ahead, or try to turn off the road,
to the west, to get out of the way of the Walters
pickup truck. Because of the bridge on the east
side of the road she was in the position of going
straight ahead, directly into the approaching pickup
truck, or turning to the left to attempt to get off
the road.
The factual situation in this case is almost on
all fours with the factual situation presented in
Morrison v. Perry, 104 Utah 151, 140 Pacific 2nd
772. In that case the deceased (Plaintiff )was driving on his left side of the road and the defendant
was driving on his right side of the road. When
the cars were approximately 225 feet apart, the
defendant turned to the left side of the road and
the plaintiff at that time turned right, to his proper
10
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side of the road, and a collision occurred on the
defendant's wrong :side of the road. As in our case,
the facts in Morrison v. Perry, involved a collision
whereby the plaintiff and defendant collided on the
plaintiff's proper side of the road, but the evidenc-e
in the case having been produced to show that
plaintiff had originally been on his wrong side of
road, 225 feet before impact, and with the impendin gemergency defendant turned left to avoid a
headon collision, just as plaintiff turned right, to
his proper side of the road.
The factual situation in the Morrison vs. Perry
case, and the instructions given in that case, are
very close in fact with the case now before this
court. The legal principles set forth in the Morrison
vs. Perry decision are squarely applicable to the
situation in this case and indicate without question
the error in the court's instruction number 17.
In the Morrison vs. Perry case the court, Utah
Supreme Court, in granting a new trial, and in
holding that the trial court committed error in the
instructions, said:
"In instruction No. 2, the court propounds the following:
1. Did the defendant, at the time of or
immediately preceding this accident, drive
his automobile at a high, angerous and unlawful rate of speed or at a rate of speed
faster than was reasonable and prudent, having due regard to the surfac-e and width of
the highway and traffic thereon?
11
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2. Did the defendant, at the time of or
immediately preceding this accident, drive
his car without having it under immediate
control, so that he could not stop it within
the range of his vision?
3. Did the defendant at the time of or
immediately preceding this accident, fail to
keep a careful lookout ahead for other cars
on the highway?
4. Did the defendant, at the time of or
immediately preceding this accident, while
driving his car upon the highway, suddenly
and without warning swerve his car sharply
to the left directly in the path of and against
the truck driven by Mr. Spiers?
5. Did the defendant, at the time of or
immediately preceding this accident, drive
his car on the wrong, or lefthand, side of the
highway?
"Following this the instruction goes on:
'If you answer all of these questions
in the negative then you should bring a
verdict in favor of the defendant. But
if you answer any or all of these questions in the affirmative then you must
determine the following question: Was
the defendant, in so driving his automobile, guilty of negligence?'
The following questions were then asked
with respect to the alleged grounds of contributory negligence:
1. Did the deceased, John K. Spiers, at
the time of or immediately preceding this accident, drive his truck on the wrong side of
the highway?
12
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2. Did the deceased, at the time of or
immediately preceding this accident, drive his
truck at a rate of speed faster than was
reasonable and prudent having due regard
to the surface and with of the highway and
conditions then existing and the traffic
thereon?
3. Did the deceased, at the time of or
immediately preceding this accident, fail to
have his truck under immediate control?
4. Did the deceased, at the time of or
immediately preceding this accident, while
driving on the wrong side of the highway,
suddenly and without warning turn his automobile into and against the car driven by the
defendant?
"The court then states:
'If your answer to any of these questions is in the affirmative, then you must
determine the following: Was the deceased, in so driving his truck, guilty of
negligence?'
"In other instructions the court stated in
substance that a person who drove an automobile in the manner described in the propounded questions was negligent, and in Instruction No. 13, instructed with respect to
an emergency allegedly created by the deceased. The jury was told that if a person
drove his car in a certain manner he was negligent, and also that if he drove his car in
that manner they were then to determine
whether or not he was negligent. Thus the
jury was permitted to decide that acts of negligence as a matter of law were not negligent.
13
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These instructions were conflicting and the
giving of such instructions constitutes error.
Sorenson v. Bell, 51 Utah 262, 170 P. 172.
"The court in question number 5 of Instruction No. 2, concerning defendant's negligence failed to take into consideration defendant's theory of the case. Defendant
alleged and offered evidence to prove that
deceased created an emergency by operating
his truck on the wrong side of the road. The
form of the instruction was such as to definitely suggest that driving on the left-hand
side of the highway by defendant was in fact
negligence, and it was not pointed out that
his so doing, would not constitute negligence
if deceased created a hazard and that plaintiff
could not take advantage of deceased's wrong
predicate liability on defendant's acts in failing to exercise perfect judgment to avoid an
e.mergency.
"Defendant's theory, which was support·ed by evidence, was that deceased, by driving
on his left-hand side of the highway, and his
failure to turn to his right side in time to
avoid creating an emergency, did create an
emergency w h i c h confronted defendant
through no fault of his. The court failed to
properly separate the theories of the parties,
but instead gave general instructions treating
the rights and duties of each driver as being
mutual without regard to defendant's theory
as to deceased's negligence in first oeing on
his wrong side of the highway. Defendant is
entitled to have his case submitted to the jury
on any theory justified by proper evidence.
Morgan v. Bingham Stag.e Line Co., 75 Utah
87, 283 P. 160; Hartley v. Salt Lake City, 41
14
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Utah 121, 124 P. 522; Pratt v. Utah Light &
Traction Co., 57 Utah 7, 169 P. 868; Smith v.
Lenzi, 74 Utah 362, 279 P. 893; Martineau v.
H·anson, 47 Utah 549, P. 432.
"Each party is entitled to have his theory
of the case presented in such a way as to aid
the jury and not confus-e it. In Throne v. J. P.
O'Neill Construction Company, 40 Utah 265,
121 P. 10, 16, the court suggests the better
.practice of presenting the parties' theories of
the case to thejury:
"'One way the court might have followed in charging the jury would have
been to charge them in separate instructio:ns, first, in accordance with respondent's evidence; and, second, in accordance
with appellant's evidence which related
to the proposition covered by the instruction in question, and in each instruction
have directed the jury to return a verdict
in accordance with their findings upon
that question.' "
Giving of a formula instruction was held reversible error in Ivie v. Richardson, 9 Utah 2d 5, 11,
336 P. 2d 781, for the following reasons:
"The court gave this Instruction No. 4:
"If you find from a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant failed to ke·ep
and maintain a proper lookout for the plaintiff in the driveway where the accident occurred and that such failure promixately
resulted in the accident, then your verdict
must be in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendant.'
15
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"The above instruction, taken by itself,
is in error because it fails to take into account
the possible contributory negligence of the
plaintiff. This kind of instruction, sometimes
referred to as a 'formula' instruction, which
makes a recital in accordance with the contention of a party and ·ends with a conclusion:
'* * * and if you so find, then your verdict
must be for (the party)' is not generally a
good type of instruction to give. This is so
because it lends itself to the error just noted
and also be·caus·e it tends to be argumentative
rather than to set out the principles of law
applicable to the issues impartially as to both
parties. For such reasons it is better to avoid
giving instructions of that type. It is con·
ceded that the issue of contributory negligence was properly covered in the next instruction. This, how·ever, pitted one instruction against the other and might have been
confusing to the jury.' "
The Missouri court in Rearick vs. Manzella,
355 S.W. 2d 134, 136 (Mo.), used similar language
in reversing a jury award which was based upon a
formula instruction:
"It is here contended by defendant that
the trial court erred in giving plaintiff's verdict-directing Instruction No. 1 because it
failed to refer to or negative plaintiff's contributiory negligence submitted as a defense
in defendant's Instruction No. 7, 'thereby
creating a conflict between the two instructions.' In view of present controlling decisions it is our manifest duty to sustain the
contention."
16

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A. later instruction directing the jury to consider
all instructions together was held insufficient to
correct the error.
The Supreme Court of New Mexico similarly
observed in McFatridge vs. Harlem Globe Trotters,
365 p ..2d 918:
"There are innumerable cases holding
that a 'for.mula' instruction must include each
and every element requisite to support averdict, and that omission of any of these elements can not be supplied by reference to
other instructions correctly stating the law."
See also Whaley vs. Crutchfield, 294 S.W.
2d 775 (Ark.).
In Bey.erle v. Clift (Calif.), 209 Pac. 1015, the
California court reversed a judgment because a for.mula instruction did not include all conditions of
recovery.
"The errors relied upon consist in the
giving of two instructions to the jury. In
each of these instructions, the court stated
certain provisions of law defining the duties
imposed upon an operator of a vehicle, and
then said:
" 'If, therefore, you believe that the defendant violated any of the provisions of the
law above mentioned at the time of the accident complained of in this case, and that such
violation was the proximate cause of the
accident, you should find for the plaintif.'
"Assuming that the issue of contributory
negligence was properly before the court,
there is no doubt that these w·ere erroneous
17
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instructions, because it is settled law that, if
an instruction by its terms purports to state
the conditions necessary to a verdict, it must
state all those conditions and must not overlook pleaded defenses on which substantial
evidence has been introduced.
"The court gave other instructions on the
subject of contributory negligence, the correctness of which is not challenged. But this
is not sufficient to overcome the prejudicial
character of the erroneous instructions.
"'* * * But the giving of these other instructions simply produced a clear conflict in
the instructions given the jury by the court,
and it is impossible for us to say which instruction the jury followed in arriving at a
verdict in favor of plaintiff.' Pierce v. United
Gas & Elc. Co., supra, 161 Cal. at page 185,
118 Pac. at page 704."
The Utah Supreme Court has held that error
arising fro.m conflicting instructions is prejudicial
and is not cured by other correct instructions, because there i:s no doubt whether the jury followed
the. proper instruction or the improper one. Sorensen v. Bell, 51 U tab 262, 170 P. 72.
Morgan v. Bingham Stage Lines, 75 Utah 87,
283 Pac. 160, was reversed for a new trial for a new
trial for failure to instruct the jury in defendant's
theory of contributory negligence.
"A party is entitled to have his case submitted to the jury on the theory of his evidence as well as upon the theory of the whole
evidence. Toone v. O'Neill Cbnst. Co., 40 Utah
18
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265, 121 P. 10, Hartley v. Salt Lake City, 41
Utah 121, 124 P. 522, 523, and Miller v. Utah
Consol. M. Co., et al, ·53 U tab 366, 178 P. 771;
Pratt v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 57 Utah
7, 169 P. 868.
"The following language of Mr. Justice
Straup in the case of Hartley v. Salt Lake
City, supra, is particularly applicable here:
" 'There are two parties to a lawsuit.
Each on a submission of the case to the jury
is entitled to a submission of it on his theory
and the law in respect thereof. The defendant's theory as to the cause of the accident
is embodied in the proposed requests. There
is some evidence, as we have shown, to render
them applicable to the case. That is not disputed. We think the court's refusal to charge
substantially as requested was error. That
the ruling was prejudicial and works a reversal of the judgment is self-evident and
unavoidable.' "
The failure of the court to properly instruct the
jury on the question of contributory negligence or
defendant's theory of emergency caused by plaintiffs in connection with Instruction No. 17 had the
effect of failing to submit the case to the jury on
defendant's theory of the case.
An instruction which does not contain all of the
elements dealing with the particular proposition
under instruction, or is susceptible to more than on~
conclusion, constitutes reversible error. Even
though following instructions may properly define
the issue in question, such does not remedy the de.
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feet. The error results from pitting one instruction
against another, which may confuse the jury.
In the instant case Instruction 17 was not only
confusing but was in conflict with other instructions.
Were the jury to follow one, it must of necessity ignore another. The offending instruction in the instant case violates the clear statement of Morrison v.
Perry, 104 Utah 151, 140 P. 2d 772, because the instruction as given, did not "aid the jury" but could
only mislead and confuse it."
In the case of Jensen v. Utah Railway Company, 72 Utah 366, 386, 270 P. 349, the Supreme
Court condemned the use of "formula" instructions
which tend to apply more general principles of law
to a case without relating them to facts.
"The rule is well settled that in instructing a jury a mere abstract or general statement as to the law should be avoided, and
that all instructions should be applicable to
evidence on either on or the other of the respective theories of the parties. Instructions
which are not so applicable, though abstractly
they may be correct, are not helpful to the
jury, are apt to be misleading and to be improperly applied. That a proposition may be
correct in a sense, and yet inapplicable to the
evidence or to the issue, is readily perceived."
The mere fact that another instruction mentioned the theory of defendant is insufficient to
correct that error:
"It is conceded that the issue of contributory negligence was properly covered in the
20
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next instruction. This, however, pitted one
instruction against the other and might have
been confusing to the jury." lvie v. Richardson, 9 Utah 2d 5, 336 P. 2d 781.
Clark v. Los Angeles-Salt Lake Railway Company, 73 Utah 486, 502, 508, 275 P. 582, declares the
law with reference to the type of error which must
be committed before a reversal will be granted.
"All committed errors, of course, are not
presumptively prejudicial, but, when the error
is of such nature or character as calculated
to do harm, prejudice will be presumed until
by the record it is affirmatively shown that
the error was not nor could have been of
harmful effect. Jensen v. Utah Railway Company, 72 Utah 366, 270 P. 349." (Emphasis
added.)
Obviously, all of the theories of the case cannot
be :stated in one instruction and instructions which
explain a particular instruction are proper. In the
instant case the "natural and obvious meaning" of
Instruction 17 could only lead to conflict and confusion with Instructions 5, 11, 18 dealing with
contributory negligence, because they were antagonistic to each other. To believe one was to reject
another. Thus, an irreconcilable conflict was presented to the jury.
A formula instruction as given in this case has
ben condemned by the Utah Supreme Court be·cause
it tends to pit one instruction against another. To
have followed one instruction would have been to
disr.egard the other.
21
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While the court informed the jury that each
instruction set out the theory of the two parties, it
did nothing to clarify or to reconcile the obvious
antagonis.m betw·een the instructions. The jury was
still faced with the proposition of accepting one and
rejecting the other.
When an instruction is prejudicially erroneous
on its face, a new trial is in order because the jury
is presumed to follow the instructions of the court.
The Supreme Court in the case of Ryan v. Beaver
County, 82 Utah 27, 31, 21 P. 2d 858 stated:
"The jury is bound, on questions of law,
to yield full obedience to the instructions of
the Court, and this applies as well to that
part of the charge defining the issues, as
made by the pleadings, as to the law declared
by the court, and made applicable to the evidence as submitted."
The following language of Mr. Justice Straup
is taken from the case of Jensen v. Utah Railway
Company, 72 Utah 366, 400, 270 P. 349, 362:
"However, where the committed error is
of such nature or character as calculated to
do hann, or on its face as having the natural
tendency to do so, prejudice will be presumed,
until by the record it is affirmatively shown
that the error was nor or could not have been
of harmful effect. Thus, if the appellant
shows committed error of such nature or
character, he, in the first instance, has made
a prima facie showing of prejudice. The burden, or rather the duty of going forward, is
22
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then cast on the respondent to show by the
record that the committed error was not, or
could not have been, of harmful effect." (Citing cases)
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT
THE JURY IN ACCORDANCE WITH DEFENDANT'S
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 13, RELATING TO
THE STATUTORY DUTY OF A DRIVER OPERATING
A VEHICLE TO THE LEFT OF THE CENTER OF THE
HIGHWAY IN OVERTAKING AND PASSING ANOTHER
VEHICLE TRAVELLING IN THE SAME DIRECTION.

Def·endant's Requested Instruction No. 13 (R.
30) was refused by the court.
"You are instructed that under the laws
of Utah that no vehicle shall be driven to the
left side of the center of a roadway in overtaking and passing of another vehicle proceeding in the same direction unless such left
side is clearly visible and is free from oncoming traffic for sufficient distance ahead to
permit such overtaking and passing to be
completely made without interfering with the
safe operation of any vehicle approaching
from the opposite direction of any vehicle
overtaking. In every ·event, the overtaking
vehicle must return to the right hand side of
the road before coming within 100 feet of
any vehicle approaching from the opposite
direction. If you find from the evidence that
Harry Walters, in passing another vehicle,
and driving to the left side of the highway
in overtaking and passing another vehicle
proceeding in the same direction and he. did
not return to his own side of the highway,
without interfering with the safe operation
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of the Pelly vehicle approaching from the opposite direction, then Harry Walters was
negligent, and if you find that his negligence
was the proximate cause of the collision, then
you must return a verdict in favor of the
defendant and against the plaintiff. No Cause
of Action."
The requested instruction is in conformity with
the provisions of Title 41-6-57, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which code section provides:
"No vehicle shall be driven to the left side
of the center of the roadway in overtaking
and passing another vehicle proceeding in the
same direction unless such left side is clearly
visible and is free of oncoming traffic for a
sufficient distance ahead to permit such overtaking and passing to be completely made
without interfering with the safe operation
of any vehicle approaching from the opposite
direction of any vehicle overtaken. In every
event the overtaking vehicle must return to
the right-hand side of the roadway before
coming within 100 feet of any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction."
Exception was duly taken to the court's refusal
to instruct the jury in accordance with the defendant's theory and the statute quoted. (R. 312)
There was competent and substantial evidence
by the independent eyewitness Alden Roberts that
Harry Walters was attempting to pass oether vehicles travelling in the same direction, and Walters
was on the left side of the highway for several blocks
and remained on that side of the highway until the
24
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Walters truck and the Pelly car, approaching from
the south, were very close together. The accident
occurred as both vehicles suddenly turned to the
west side of the highway. (R. 290-292-293)
The refusal of the court to instruct the jury in
accordance with defendant''S theory as to the negligence of Harry Walters and the cause of the collision was prejudicial error. A party has a right
to have his theory of the case submitted to the jury
if the evidence would justify reasonable men in following the theory, and the court has the duty to
cover the theory of both parties in the instructions.
Morrison v. P·erry, 104 Utah 151, 140 P. 12d 772;
Beckstrom v. Williams, 282 P. 2d 309, 3 Utah 2nd
210; Startin v. Madsen, 120 Utah 631, 237 P. 2d 834.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING TO
THE JURY THE QUESTION OF DEFENDANT'S SPEED,
AS NEGLIGENCE.

There is no evidence in the record to indicate
that the vehicle driven by Barbara Best Pelly was
driven at an excessive rate of speed or that there
were any conditions existing that made the stated
speed limit an unsafe speed for travel. Instruction
No. 11, (R. 40) charged the jury that it was the
duty of the defendant to use reasonable care under
the circumstances to avoid danger to himself and
others, and to observe due care in respect to:
"(d) to drive at such speed as was safe, reasonable and prudent under the circum25
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stances, having due regard to the width
surface and condition of the highway, the
traffic thereon, the visibility, and any actual
or potential hazards then existing.
"The designated speed limits for the place
in question was 60 miles per hour. This means
only that such speed should ordinarily be
regarded as safe, reasonable and prudent in
the absence of any special hazards or conditions tending to make such speed unsafe.
But any speed in excess of such designated
speed limit would constitute sufficient evidence to permit a finding that such speed
was greater than safe, reasonable and prudent.
"Failure of the plaintiff or defendant to
operate his automobile in accordance with the
foregoing requirements of law would constitute negligence on his part."
"A. That the defendant was driving her
automobile at a speed in excess of 60 miles
per hour.

"* * *

"if you find the defendant negligent in any
one of more of the items set out in A, etc.,
and you find that one or more of such acts
or omissions were the proximate cause of the
injuries to plaintiff, then you must find for
the plaintiffs in such amounts as your judgment dictates and directs. * * *"
The record is void of any evidence that the
deceased Barbara Best Pelly was driving in excess
of 50 miles per hour at or near the scene of the
accident. The only evidence as to the speed of Mrs.
26
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Pelly is the testimony of the witness Robert Averett, who testified that he had followed behind Mrs.
Pelly for a mile preceding the accident, and she was
travelling the same speed as Averett, around 50
miles per hour, and he was positive it was not over
50 miles per hour. (R. 196) The court instructed
the jury that the speed limit was 60 miles per hour.
(R. 40)
It is erroneous to submit an issue of negligence
to the jury for consideration when there is no factual
evidence to support that claimed act of negligence.
Morrison v. Perry, 104 Utah 151, P. 2d 772. Hunter
v. Michaelis, 114 Utah 242, 198, P. 2d 245, held that
it was erroneous for the trial court case to instruct
the jury concerning the matter of speed as negligence, where the evidence showed that the posted
speed limit was 25 miles per hour and the only evidence in the case was that the defendant was travelling between 20 to 25 miles per hour. The court
said, "We think the evidence not such as to justify
giving an instruction on the speed of defendant's
car."
POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SUBMIT
TO THE JURY DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 7, WHICH INSTRUCTION ENCOMPASSED
THE DEFENDANT'S THEORY OF THE CASE THAT
THE CONDUCT OF THE PLAINTIFF CREATED AN
EMERGENCY SITUATION, AND WHICH THEORY WAS
SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT, SUBSTANTIAL EVI·
DENCE.
27
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Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 7 was:
"If you find from the evidence in this
case, that Harry Walters was driving on the
left side of the highway as the car driven by
Harry Walters and Mrs. Pelly approached
each other, and if this driving on the left side
of the highway by Harry Walters resulted
in an emergency, which caused Mrs. Pelly to
turn to the left and resulted in the collision,
that said turning to the left side of the highway by Mrs. Pelly would not constitute negligence on her part, and she would not be
negligent for turning to the left, if the turning wa:s a result of the hazard created by
Harry Walters."
This instruction requested by defendant was
amply supported by the evidence of the witnesses
Averett and Roberts, who testified that defendant's
vehicle was on its own side of the road until just
before impact and that the vehicle of plaintiffs approached on its wrong side of the road and turned
suddenly to the right or west side of the road just
as the defendant turned to that side of the road .
The court in refusing to give Instruction No. 7
as requested by the plaintiff, or to instruct the jury
in accordance with the theory set forth in that instruction committed prejudicial error. Defendant
exeepted to the refusal of the court to give the instruction. (R. 311). Defendant was entitled to have
the jury instructed upon defendant's theory of the
case and the failure to do so was and is prejudicial
·error, and as stated in Morrison v. P·erry, 104 Utah
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151, 140 P. 2d 772, and cases cited therein; Beckstrom v. Williams, 282 P. 2d 309, 3 Utah 2d 210;
Startin v. M~adsen, 120 Utah 631, 237 P. 2d 834.
POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO.
3, WHICH INSTRUCTION SET FORTH THE STATUTORY RULE AS TO THE NATURE OF EVIDENCE
REQUIRED WHEN THE TORT FEASOR IS DEAD.

Defendant requested the court to give requested Instruction No. 3, which requested instruction is
identical with the instruction No. 5.1, Jury Instruc~
tions for Utah, and is the instruction incorporating
the provisions of Title 78-11-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, Laws of Utah, 1953, Chapter 30, Paragraph 1. The statute provides:
"Causes of action arising out of physical
injury to the person or death, caused by the
wrongful act or negligence of another, shall
not abate upon the death of the wrongdoer,
and the injured person or the personal representatives or heirs of one meeting death, as
above stated, shall have a cause of action
against the personal representatives of the
wrongdoer; provided, however, that the injured person or the personal representatives
or heirs of one meeting death shall not recover judgment except upon some competent
satisfactory evidence other than the testi. mony of said injured person."
Barbara Best Pelly, driver of the car which was
involved in the collision with the vehicles of plaintiffs died as a result of the accident. Prior to 1953
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and the adoption of Title 78, Chapter 11, Section 12,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, any cause of action
for personal injury abated with the death of the
tort feasor. The legislature, in providing for the
"no abatement" of a cause of action upon the death
of a wrongdoer, provided certain restrictions as to
the evidence necessary for injured parties to recover
against the personal representative of the alleged
wrongdoer. The statute, giving, in effect, a cause
of action to plaintiffs, which they would not have
had previously, places a restriction upon the plaintiff''S cause of action, and the court erred in not
instructing the jury as to the restrictions and the
burden of proof required by the statute for plaintiffs to recover. The Utah Court in the case of Fretz
v. Anderson, 5 Utah 2d 290, 300 P. 2d 642, recognized that the plaintiff in a personal injury action,
where the alleged tort :feasor was dead, had the
burden of proving the negligence in the manner set
forth by the statute.
Defendant wa:s prejudiced by the failure of the
court to instruct the jury in accordance with the
provision of Title 78-11-12, Utah Code Annotated,
1953.
POINT VI.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING REPETI·
TIOUS INSTRUCTIONS WHICH PREJUDICIALLY EM·
PHASIZED PLAINTIFF'S THEORY OF RECOVERY IN
THE CASE.

Defendant made timely exception to the court's
30
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instructions as a whole as being prejudicial and over
emphasizing plaintiffs' theory of the case. (R. 318)
The court in Instruction No. 1 (R. 34) charged
the jury:
"Plaintiffs allege that defendant's negligence and unlawful conduct, which proximately caused the accident and resultant injuries, consisted of the following:
A. In driving at an excessive rate of
speed, to-wit, in excess of 60 miles per hour.
B. In crossing over the dividing center
line of said highway into the opposing lane
of traffic when it was not safe to do so.
C. In failing to keep said automobile
under proper control.
D. In failing to keep a proper lookout
in failing to see the automobile driven by
Plaintiff, Harry Walters.
E. In running head on into the automobile of Plaintiff, Harry Walters, then and
there perfectly visible and approaching from
the opposite direction in its own lane of
traffic."
The court in Instruction No. 11 (R. 40) instructed the jury again concerning the various
duties and obligations of the plaintiffs and defendants, as follows:
"It was the duty of the plaintiff and the
defendant each to use reasonable care under
the circumstances in driving his automobile
to avoid danger to himself and others, and
to observe and to be aware of the conditions
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of the highway, the traffic thereon, and to
observe due care in respect to:
(a) To use reasonable care to keep a
proper lookout for other vehicles and other
conditions reasonably to be anticipated.
(b) To keep his automobile under reasonably safe and proper control.
(c To drive his automobile on his own
right side of the highway.
(d) To drive at such speed as was safe,
reasonable, and prudent under the circumstances, having due regard to the width, surface, and condition of the highway, the traffic
thereon, the visibility and any actual or potential hazards then existing.
"The designated :speed limit for the place
in question was 60 miles per hour. This means
only that such speed should ordinarily be
regarded as safe, reasonable, and prudent in
the absence of any special hazards or conditions tending to make such speed unsafe. But
any speed in excess of such designated speed
limit would constitute sufficient evidence to
permit a find that 'Such speed was greater
than safe, reasonable, and prudent.
"Failure of the plaintiff or the defendant
to operate his automobile in accordance with
the foregoing requirements of law would
constitute negligence on his part."
The court again instructed the jury regarding
the claimed negligence on the part of defendant in
Instruction No. 17 (R. 46) as follows:
"In order for you to find a verdict in
32
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favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant, the plaintiffs have the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence
one or more of the following facts:
"A. That the defendant was driving her
automobile at a speed in excess of 60 miles
per hour.
"B. In crossing the center line of the
highway into the opposing lane of traffic
when it was not safe so to do.
"C. In failing to keep said automobile
under proper control.
"D. In failing to keep a proper lookout
and in failing to see the automobile driven
by the plaintiff.
"E. In running head on into the automobile of the plaintiff."
In three separate instructions the court set
forth the items of claimed negligence on the part
of the defendant's decedent, Babraba Best Pelly.
Our Supreme Court has long subscribed to the
principle of law which prohibits reiteration of legal
propositions to the jury. This doctrine was stated
in the case of Shields v. Utah Light & Traction Company, 99 Utah 307, 105 P. 2d 347, as follows:
". . . (R) esulting emphasis on applicable
laws favorable to plaintiff's side as the result
of the continual reference and repeating of
certain law propositions resulted in the unbalancing of the charge, and error."
The fact that the instructions as given are each
technically correct does not remedy the error. In
the case of Devine v. Cook, 3 Utah 2d 134, 141;
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279 P. 2d 1073 (1955), the court, in considering the
rule, declared:
"Even assuming that the instructions of
the Court, taken in their entirety, could be
considered correct as given, the continual repetition of instructions of contributory negligence . . . unbalanced the instructions in
favor of the defendants and influenced the
jury in bringing its verdict of no cause of
action ...."
It is respectfully submitted that the cumulative
effect of the instructions given resulted in an imbalance in favor of plaintiffs, and that defendant was
materially prejudiced thereby.
CONCLUSION
Prejudicial error was committed by the trial
court, and the court erred in failing to grant defendant and appellant's Motion for New Trial, which
motion was timely made. The error at trial, giving
erroneous jury instructions and failing to give jury
instructions to which defendant was entitled prevented defendant and appellant having a fair trial.
Justice and law requires that the Judgment Upon
the Verdict be set aside and the case remanded for
new trial.
Respectfully submitted,

HA,NSON & BALDWIN
Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr.
909 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Defendant
and Appellant.
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